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Introduction
Since the late 2000s, YouTube has evolved from being just 
one of the popular international video-sharing platforms to 
being a successful tool for political campaigning, with the 
2008 Obama presidential election campaign being an impor-
tant milestone for this development (Scherr et al., 2015). 
Many studies have been conducted on the usage of YouTube 
in political communication, both by politicians (Gibson and 
McAllister, 2011; Gueorguieva, 2008) and by civil society 
actors (Ridout et al., 2015; Thorson et al., 2013), in particu-
lar, during elections of public officials (Gulati & Williams, 
2010; Sohal & Kaur, 2018). However, these studies have 
largely focused on Western contexts, and, so far, no research 
has been conducted on the role of YouTube in political com-
munication in non-democratic contexts.
At the same time, research on so-called “consultative 
authoritarianism” (He & Warren, 2011) has focused on the 
increasing use of social media by authoritarian elites (Gunitsky, 
2015; Toepfl, 2018; Truex, 2017); however, it has not yet scru-
tinized the role of the global video-sharing platform, YouTube, 
in authoritarian political communication.
My study aims at addressing these two gaps in the exist-
ing research by exploring the role of YouTube during elec-
tions under consultative authoritarianism. How do different 
political actors co-opt the global platform in a country with a 
restrictive media environment? Russia, where traditional 
media are widely controlled by the state, but where the inter-
net still offers the possibility of free speech, constitutes a per-
fect example for addressing this question. In the last 5 years, 
YouTube has established itself in Russia as an alternative to 
state TV, with a high level of political content among trend-
ing videos (Goncharov, 2017).
In 2017, political analysts in Russia started to talk about 
the rise of YouTube as a protest space, especially for the 
younger generation, who generally does not watch TV 
(Gorbachev, 2017). The reason for this conclusion was the 
so-called “protests of schoolchildren,” which were triggered 
by Alexey Navalny’s YouTube video accusing then prime 
minister Dmitri Medvedev of corruption.
Parallel to the growth of YouTube as a politicized space, 
the Russian state has been consequently co-opting social 
media and, today, uses them to promote its own agenda 
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(Fedor & Fredheim, 2017; Gunitsky, 2015). After the “pro-
tests of schoolchildren” in 2017, Russian pro-state actors 
increased their efforts to co-opt the platform (Golubeva, 
2017).
This study maps Russian popular political YouTube vid-
eos during the final stage of the presidential campaign in 
2018, starting from the oppositional rallies on January 28, 
2018, to 1 week after the elections, March 25. It is based on 
a qualitative content analysis of 169 political videos from the 
top 12 most popular videos on Russian YouTube. I have ana-
lyzed the public created on Russian YouTube around politi-
cal topics during presidential election by drawing on Toepfl’s 
(2020) theoretical approach to publics under authoritarian 
rule. Toepfl has suggested distinguishing between three types 
of authoritarian publics according to discursive practices 
typical of these publics: uncritical publics, policy-critical 
publics, and leadership-critical publics. In his approach, the 
publics are analyzed according to three main components: 
participants, environment, and discursive practices (Toepfl, 
2020, p. 6).
The remainder of this article is divided into six sections: 
First, I review the academic literature on consultative author-
itarianism, particularly on the use of social media by authori-
tarian elites. Then I look at the existing studies on political 
communication on YouTube. In the third section, I describe 
the methodology and present findings. Drawing on the 
results of the study, I discuss the risks and benefits of 
YouTube publics for the Russian authoritarian regime as well 
as the role of YouTube in authoritarian elections.
Consultative Authoritarianism and 
Social Media
Early works on the spread of information and communication 
technologies were rather optimistic with regard to the liberal-
ization potential of the web and focused mostly on the role of 
the internet in mobilizing bottom-up movements, in demo-
cratic as well as authoritarian contexts (Gunitsky, 2015; 
Robinson, 2010). However, in the last decade, authoritarian 
regimes have shown remarkable resilience to new communi-
cation technologies, and scholars have started to talk about a 
worldwide authoritarian “resurgence” (Walker, 2015). A 
range of studies have appeared on how authoritarian rulers 
have co-opted internet tools and used them to legitimize and 
stabilize their regimes (Gunitsky, 2015; Pearce, 2015). The 
new term “consultative,” or “deliberative,” authoritarianism 
(He & Warren, 2011; Stockmann, 2013) was coined to 
describe “a form of rule in which power holders use commu-
nication to collect the preferences of those their decisions will 
affect and take those preferences into account as information 
relevant to their decision-making” (He & Warren, 2011, 
p. 273). Researchers have described different benefits as well 
as risks that so-called “input institutions” (Nathan, 2003) 
have brought to authoritarian leaders (He & Warren, 2011; 
Toepfl, 2018; Truex, 2017). These institutions, which include, 
among other things, media, help elites gather citizen feedback 
for the government, co-opt the opposition, and give an oppor-
tunity for antagonists of the regime to “vent their anger” as 
well as to resolve social conflicts (Toepfl, 2020). The main 
risk of input institutions for the state is that providing a cer-
tain degree of freedom of expression may place the legiti-
macy of the ruling elites under question and thus endanger the 
regime (Stockmann, 2013; Toepfl, 2020).
A big part of research on the use of social media by authori-
tarian elites deals with case studies from China, a pioneer of 
“consultative authoritarianism” (Truex, 2017), where a range of 
input institutions were implemented starting in the early 2000s 
(He & Warren, 2011; Nathan, 2003). Today, these input institu-
tions are, to a large extent, represented by online interactive por-
tals. Truex (2017) performed a survey experiment with Chinese 
internet users and found out that citizens who randomly used the 
National People’s Congress’ (NPC) online participation portals 
showed “greater satisfaction with the regime and feelings of 
government responsiveness” (Truex, 2017, p. 329).
In Russia, a move from an anocratic (Marshall & Cole, 
2009), or semi-authoritarian (Toepfl, 2012), political regime 
toward authoritarianism in stricter terms aligned with growing 
attempts by state actors both to gain legal control over the inter-
net and to infiltrate online communicative milieus. Prior to 
2013, there had only been a few studies on the digital communi-
cation of Russian elites, and they mostly focused on blogging on 
the part of governmental officials (Bode & Makarychev, 2013; 
Toepfl, 2012). As Toepfl (2012) found out, 29 out of 83 regional 
leaders were running blogs in 2010. He examined the content of 
these blogs and concluded that they played “a far greater role in 
generating legitimacy for the Russian political system than they 
do in democracies, because the semi-authoritarian Russian sys-
tem lacks other mechanisms which generate (input) legitimacy 
in developed democracies” (Toepfl, 2012, p. 1455). Bode and 
Makarychev compared the content of oppositional and pro-gov-
ernmental bloggers in 2011–2012 and found that pro-state blogs 
were used by state officials as “depoliticizing tools meant to 
decrease the degree of—and space for—political expression” 
(Bode & Makarychev, 2013, p. 55). After the increase of state 
engagement in co-optation of the internet as a reaction to the 
protests of 2011–2012 in Russia, more studies of what Strukov 
(2012) called “networked Putinism” appeared. Gunitsky 
described how Russian authorities used social media to stabilize 
the regime. He distinguished four strategies of co-optation of 
social media in authoritarian contexts: (1) counter-mobilization, 
(2) discourse framing, (3) preference divulgence, and (4) elite 
coordination (Gunitsky, 2015, p. 42). Toepfl (2018) explored 
how the state proactively uses democratizing internet tools, for 
example, online voting, to legitimize the regime. On the exam-
ple of the case of internet votes for the President’s Council on 
the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, he ana-
lyzed how this tool was used by the state, on one hand, to “con-
vey to the mass public the image of a transparent, accountable 
and responsive government” and, on the other hand, to co-opt 
oppositional elites (Toepfl, 2018).
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That said, it must be noted that social media have been 
used effectively in Russia to also voice dissent against the 
state. This trend increased in 2011, when the protest move-
ment “For Fair Elections” marked a “turning point for the 
socio-political situation in Russia” (Klyueva, 2016). As 
many studies have shown, social media, particularly 
Facebook, played a significant role in mobilizing the protest-
ers (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2013; Denisova, 2017; 
Klyueva, 2016). The opposition adopted online tools for self-
organization (Klyueva, 2016), and, since 2012, the state has 
reacted by restricting online spaces. However, criticism of 
elites is still visible in public space, in particular, on social 
media platforms (Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019).
As Toepfl (2020) has suggested in his recent theory of 
authoritarian publics, China and Russia represent two different 
types of authoritarian regimes that diverge in the discursive 
practices dominant in their publics-at-large. According to 
Toepfl, China has a policy-critical public-at-large, where criti-
cism of policies as well as of lower-level officials is tolerated, 
but not that of the country’s highest-ranking leaders. Russia, 
however, has a leadership-critical public-at-large, where even 
political leadership of the country is regularly criticized in cer-
tain publics that attract a significant number of the country’s 
citizens (Toepfl, 2020). The third type of public-at-large is 
uncritical publics, which can be found in the most restrictive 
regimes, such as North Korea or Turkmenistan, and which do 
not allow their citizens space for any type of criticism if it is not 
sanctioned by the leader (Toepfl, 2020). For the study of con-
sultative authoritarianism, the two first types of authoritarian 
regimes are of particular interest, because they tolerate a certain 
level of criticism that is necessary for the functioning of the 
input institutions.
Unlike in the Chinese regime, Russian citizens are offered 
a formal opportunity to vote for the parliament and for the 
leader of the country in authoritarian elections where no real 
chance is given for candidates who would challenge the sta-
tus quo of the country. However, this means that the govern-
ment regularly stages an election campaign where not only 
the “tamed” parliamentary opposition takes part but also the 
non-systemic opposition tries to influence the outcomes of 
the elections through informal, mostly online channels.
While the institution of elections under authoritarianism 
that can also be regarded as an “input institution” (Toepfl, 
2020) has been thoroughly explored by political scientists 
(Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Knutsen et al., 2017), the role of 
social media in authoritarian elections so far remains under-
researched. This article aims at addressing this gap by explor-
ing political communication on Russian YouTube during the 
presidential election of 2018.
Political Communication on YouTube
Founded in 2005, YouTube developed into a leading global 
video-sharing platform within just a few years, and, since 
2008, scholars have been talking about “youtubification” of 
political communication in established democracies (May, 
2010). Many studies have highlighted the democratization 
potential of the “user-driven environment of YouTube” 
(Dylko et al., 2011), especially in the aftermath of the U.S. 
presidential election of 2008 (Dylko et al., 2011; Gueorguieva, 
2008). The bottom-up communication of civil society actors 
was studied based on, among others, the examples of the 
Occupy movement (Thorson et al., 2013), ecological activ-
ism (Shapiro & Park, 2017), and the Uyghur nationalist 
movement (Vergani & Zuev, 2011). However, with growing 
commercialization and institutionalization of the platform 
(Bishop, 2018), scholars have observed an increasing trend 
in predominance of top-down communication flows on 
YouTube (Dylko et al., 2011; Kim, 2012; Shapiro & Park, 
2017). Thus, the study of the most popular political news 
videos during the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign showed 
that news sourcing and news production was controlled by 
elites, while only the secondary gatekeeping (news distribu-
tion) was dominated by non-elites (Dylko et al., 2011). It 
also found that “traditional media still retain[ed] a strong 
hold on what content the masses consume[d]” (Dylko et al., 
2011, p. 844). Similar results were presented in the study by 
May (2010) that traced the audience changes for the top 22 
political YouTube channels in the United States during the 
period 2008–2010: Corporate media were by far more suc-
cessful on the platform compared to online-only outlets. May 
also stated that, although YouTube was dominated by enter-
tainment and lifestyle content in “calm periods,” during the 
2008 election period, it showed “the ability to serve as a 
viable political communication channel” (May, 2010).
Several studies have explored the role of user-generated 
content in political videos on YouTube. Boyd (2014) classi-
fied the roles performed by users on YouTube based on her 
analysis of videos of Obama’s inaugural address in 2009, dis-
tinguishing between the first level of participation (creation, 
publishing, and viewing of videos) and the second level of 
participation (liking, disliking, and commenting on the con-
tent). In their study of German political videos prior to parlia-
mentary elections in 2009, Scherr and his colleagues (2015) 
found that user-generated content was, surprisingly, not 
among the success factors for the popular videos. Another 
study analyzed political advertising on YouTube during the 
races for the U.S. Senate in 2010 and found that political ads 
posted by ordinary users and quasi-political organizations had 
the same rate of views as those sponsored by traditional elec-
toral actors. However, new media covered the ads of tradi-
tional actors in a much more intense way compared to the 
non-traditional ones (Ridout et al., 2015). These studies show 
that, in democratic contexts, traditional actors and main-
stream media receive more voice in political communication 
on YouTube compared to non-elites. Will a similar pattern 
emerge in non-democratic contexts, where political competi-
tion is distorted by restrictions on the part of the state?
So far, very few studies have been conducted on the politi-
cal communication on YouTube beyond Western contexts 
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(Vergani & Zuev, 2011), and, so far, almost no research has 
been done on the role of YouTube in political communication 
in authoritarian contexts. This can be partly explained by the 
fact that this platform is banned in several authoritarian coun-
tries and thus does not play any significant role there, as in the 
cases of China and Pakistan. For a long time in Russia, 
YouTube was not that visible in terms of political activity. 
Studies on the role of social media in the protests “For Fair 
Elections” in 2011–2012 revealed the significant role of the 
social networking sites Facebook and Vkontakte (now VK.
com) in cultivating and informing the protests, but not that of 
YouTube (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2013; Denisova, 2017; 
Klyueva, 2016). It was the “protest of schoolchildren” in 2017 
that demonstrated the importance of this global video platform 
for Russian political communication, as the protest was trig-
gered by an investigative video published by anti-corruption 
activist Alexey Navalny on YouTube (Gorbachev, 2017).
According to Google Russia, in September 2017, 
YouTube, for the first time in its history, became the third 
most popular online website in Russia, with a monthly audi-
ence reach of 38.4 million users (approx. 26% of the Russian 
population), just behind the search engines Google and 
Yandex (Polyakova, 2017). The popularity of the YouTube 
channel of the opposition leader Alexey Navalny, who was 
not allowed to participate in presidential election, is compa-
rable to that of the top entertainment TV channels (Goncharov, 
2017). At the same time, according to the media company 
RBC, the main focus of Vladimir Putin’s presidential cam-
paign of 2018 was officially placed on his promotion in 
social media. It also highlights the importance of these chan-
nels for official political communication in Russia (RBC, 
2017). A recent study by Denisova and Herasimenka (2019) 
explored the phenomenon of rap culture on Russian YouTube. 
The authors conducted a critical discourse analysis of the rap 
videos as well as of the commentaries underneath the videos, 
and they highlighted the importance of this online space for 
political discussions of Russian users.
Despite the trend of tightening internet control in recent 
years (Vendil Palin, 2017), the Russian state has still been 
tolerating free speech on YouTube. As a result, this video-
sharing platform has become a kind of “alternative televi-
sion” in the largely state-controlled media landscape of 
Russia, which makes it a demonstrative example for study-
ing political communication on YouTube in an authoritarian 
context. This study analyses political communication on 
YouTube in an authoritarian setting by addressing the fol-
lowing research question: How did different political actors 
co-opt YouTube during the Russian presidential election of 
2018?
Method
To answer the research question, I collected a sample of the 
most popular political videos on Russian YouTube during the 
last 2 months of the presidential campaign using the following 
procedure. I observed the top 12 most popular videos that 
appeared in the “Popular” section on Russian YouTube each 
day, starting from January 28, 2018 (the day of the Russia-
wide protest rallies organized by oppositional leader Navalny) 
and running until March 25, 2018 (1 week after the elections), 
accessing YouTube from the same account, registered in 
Russia, to ensure the consistency of results. I selected all vid-
eos with political content from the “Popular” section. The final 
collection contained 176 videos. After viewing the videos, I 
removed seven items, which dealt exclusively with inner polit-
ical issues of Ukraine, insofar as they did not tackle Russian 
politics and thus were not linked to the presidential electoral 
campaign. The selection process resulted in a sample of 169 
videos.
The “Popular” section of Russian YouTube locates itself 
on the first page of the website and features 12 videos that 
have gained the most popularity on a particular day. The 
algorithm of selection of videos for this section is not quite 
transparent (Bishop, 2018) and is linked to the measurements 
of views and reactions to the videos as well as how fast they 
have been achieved (Sokolovsky, 2018). There have been 
allegations by the Russian media that pro-state actors have 
tried to manipulate the ratings of YouTube, for instance, by 
organizing large-scale operations of liking or disliking cer-
tain videos (Meduza, 2017; Sokolovsky, 2018).
The non-transparency of the YouTube algorithm and the 
alleged influence of trolls imply certain limitations for this 
study: I cannot claim that the selected videos are really the most 
viewed and commented upon videos on Russian YouTube. 
However, as Thorson and colleagues (2013) have noted, the 
YouTube recommendation system itself is “likely to affect the 
success of certain videos,” and the “Popular” section, no matter 
how it is constructed, constitutes a particular public that is 
prominently presented on Russian YouTube and therefore suits 
the analysis of political communication on the platform.
After capturing the videos, I pursued qualitative content 
analysis of the sample (Mayring, 2010). As YouTube in 
Russia may be considered to be an authoritarian public in the 
sense of Toepfl’s theory (Toepfl, 2020), I drew on theoretical 
framework by Toepfl, who suggested three key elements of 
an authoritarian public: (1) the participants involved in the 
public, both passive and active; (2) the environment within 
which these participants communicate; and (3) the discursive 
practices that participants perform (Toepfl, 2018). Moreover, 
Toepfl distinguished three types of authoritarian publics 
according to their discursive practices in terms of critics of 
the country’s high-ranked leaders: leadership-critical, pol-
icy-critical, and uncritical. In uncritical publics, virtually no 
criticism circulates at all, unless it echoes criticism previ-
ously voiced by the leadership. In policy-critical publics, 
criticism is common for all types of acts and policies, 
accounted for by lower-level officials or institutions of the 
authoritarian regime. In leadership-critical publics, criticism 
is regularly targeted even at the country’s highest-ranking 
political leadership (Toepfl, 2020).
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As a first step of analysis, I performed a pilot study of the 
corpus of 60 videos (one third of the sample) to form catego-
ries for the analysis of the three elements of the YouTube 
public. It was particularly helpful for the coding of discur-
sive practices to include not only the political orientation of 
the videos but also the forms (genres) of the video content 
into the codebook. Based on the preliminary analysis of the 
videos, the following three large groups of videos could be 
distinguished according to their form: (1) professional, (2) 
semi-professional, and (3) amateur.
As for political orientation, I tested the applicability of 
Toepfl’s approach to the case being studied. My preliminary 
analysis of data resulted in four main types of videos accord-
ing to their political orientation: (1) pro-state—videos that 
explicitly supported Putin and his government; (2) anti-oppo-
sitional—videos that defamed political opposition; (3) neu-
tral—videos that did not show any bias for or against the 
leader, but that afforded critical statements about the political 
situation as a whole; and (4) oppositional—videos that explic-
itly criticized Putin. As a second step, I related these types to 
Toepfl’s categorization, and I found that the framework was 
well applicable for analyzing the data. The first two types can 
be interpreted as “uncritical” publics in Toepfl’s terms. The 
neutral category can be related to the “policy-critical” pub-
lics. The oppositional discourse can be defined as the leader-
ship-critical public. As a result, I have included the three 
types of publics as categories in the codebook.
To analyze participants of publics, I have coded the for-
mal characteristics of the videos (author, views, likes, dis-
likes, comments) as well as the Russian political figures that 
were featured in the videos and the attitude toward them as 
expressed by the author of the video (negative/neutral/posi-
tive). Environment was also coded, with the help of formal 
characteristics (presence or absence of comments).
The coding was conducted by two coders, both fluent in 
Russian. One third of the sample (60 sub-units) was double-
coded and tested for inter-coder agreement with Cohen’s 
kappa test, and the agreement rate was between 88% and 
99% for various variables. The lowest, yet still satisfactory, 
agreement was achieved for the variables “Attitudes towards 
political figures” (88%) and “Genres of videos” (91%).
Findings
The intensity of the appearance of political videos in the top 12 
of Russian YouTube differed throughout the studied period, 
with four peaks of popularity of political content that can be 
identified within it: (1) January 28–31, 2018; (2) February 
4–6, 2018; (3) February 28 to March 1, 2018; and (4) March 
15–19, 2018. The first peak was linked to the “Voters” strike 
rallies organized by Navalny. The second was dominated by 
pro-state satirical videos against Navalny. Over the course of 
the third peak, the majority of political videos dealt with the 
scandal during the TV debates that was provoked by a fight 
between two presidential candidates, Sobchak and Zhirinovsky. 
The last peak was linked to the coverage of the elections that 
took place on March 18. It is remarkable how fast the interest 
in political topics in the YouTube video sample sank after elec-
tions. A week after the elections, only one video featuring a 
political figure (Pavel Grudinin, another presidential candi-
date) appeared within the top 12.
Across all the videos, I analyzed three elements that con-
stituted a public as suggested by Toepfl: (1) participants, (2) 
environment, and (3) discursive practices.
Participants
In this study, I closely observed only a portion of participants 
involved in the creation of the YouTube public, the group 
that Boyd, in his analysis of YouTube, called participation of 
the first level (Boyd, 2014): publishers of videos and fea-
tured speakers. As for participants of the second level (view-
ers of the videos), I have gathered information on the number 
of views to assess the size of the audience.
Forty-one out of 79 accounts that published popular polit-
ical videos can be described as oppositional, 27 as pro-state, 
and 11 as neutral. The top oppositional accounts that pub-
lished the majority of the videos in the sample were as fol-
lows: the two YouTube channels by Navalny (Alexey 
Navalny and Navalny Live) that authored 24 videos; the 
oppositional vlogger Kamikadzedead (10 videos); and the 
pro-communist journalist and politician Maxim Shevchenko 
(8). We expected a significant number of videos from the 
young liberal opposition candidate Xenia Sobchak. However, 
we spotted only one video from Sobchak’s channel in our 
sample. Although her campaign was social-media-oriented 
and targeted a younger audience, she was apparently outrun 
on YouTube by the Communist Party, which, in Russia, is 
traditionally oriented to older voters.
Only one clear leader in the pro-state “camp” could be iden-
tified: the account “Politics Today: Russia U.S.A. Ukraine” 
(“Politika segonya: Rossiya S’SH’A Ukraina”), which pub-
lished videos from pro-state federal channels (seven videos). 
This account appeared late on the top-12 list, in March 2018. 
All other pro-state accounts did not appear within the top-12 
videos in a systematic way, while Navalny’s accounts did. The 
leader of the “neutral” camp was vlogger Yury Dud, with his 
interviews with journalists and politicians (nine videos).
As for the featured political figures, only four out of eight 
presidential candidates were prominently mentioned in the 
videos (Putin, Grudinin, Zhirinovski, and Sobchak), as well 
as the oppositional leader Navalny, who was banned from 
taking part in the elections. Forty-three percent of the 46 vid-
eos that clearly supported political figures contained state-
ments of support for Navalny, 34% were for the Communist 
Party candidate Grudinin, and 23% were for Putin. The vid-
eos featuring content against political figures (47 videos) 
were mostly targeted against Putin (62%); 19% were against 
Navalny, 11% were against Grudinin, 6% were against 
Sobchak, and 2% were against Zhirinovski.
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As for the audience for the videos in our sample, the 
oppositional accounts were significantly ahead of the pro-
state ones. In our sample, we had 29 videos that had gained 
more than 1 million views as of the day of coding. Twenty of 
them contained oppositional content, 6 contained neutral 
content, and only 3 featured pro-state content. Out of the 20 
oppositional videos with more than 1 million views, 11 
belonged to Navalny’s channels. One of the most popular 
pro-state videos (with 1.12 million views) was disguised as 
an oppositional video titled This is how they cast in votes 
during elections. The second most popular featured Putin’s 
address to the Federal Assembly, and the third most popular 
was a live report by NTV on election results.
As we can see, the “Popular” section of Russian YouTube 
during the last phase of the presidential election campaign 
was clearly dominated by oppositional participants, with a 
predominance of non-systemic opposition around Navalny 
and pro-communist actors. The presence of pro-state actors 
was sporadic, and their activity lagged behind in terms of the 
number of videos and their audience.
Environment
All the videos analyzed operated in the environment of 
YouTube, which offers limited possibilities to changing techni-
cal features of channels. The only significant element that can 
be adjusted by publishers is the option for the audience to pub-
licly interact with the channel (one can enable/disable the 
option to like/dislike/comment content). My assumption was 
that pro-state channels would tend to disable participatory fea-
tures to avoid critical discussions, whereas oppositional chan-
nels would always be open to interaction with their viewers.
I have spotted eight cases where publishers have switched 
off participatory features. Contrary to expectation, these were 
publishers with varying political orientations: four pro-state 
accounts, three oppositional accounts, and one neutral account. 
As a rule, in the oppositional accounts, one could find an 
explanation of the decision of the vlogger to switch off likes 
and dislikes. For example, Kamikadzedead (2018) made this 
adjustment for a period of time to not allow pro-state trolls to 
downgrade his videos in the YouTube ratings. I could not find 
any explanations for switching off the participatory features in 
pro-state accounts. As mentioned above, in this case, we can 
assume the change in the YouTube environment can be 
explained by the intention of pro-state publishers to avoid the 
formation of oppositional publics below their videos.
Discursive Practices
The videos were coded according to the level of criticism of 
a political leader that could be observed in their content: 
uncritical, policy-critical, and leadership-critical (Toepfl, 
2020). The analysis shows that 16% of the videos constituted 
uncritical publics, 35% were policy-critical ones, and 49% 
were leadership-critical. Thus, the leadership-critical 
discourse was not only prominently present among the popu-
lar videos on YouTube but also dominated it.
As for the genres of videos, the sample contained a wide 
range of formats, from professional TV reports and talk shows 
to videos of bloggers sitting in front of their computers at home, 
or just a picture with a voiceover spoken by a bot. As already 
described in the “Method” section, I have defined the following 
three types of genres, based on the preliminary analysis of the 
videos: (1) professional, (2) semi-professional, and (3) ama-
teur. The “genre” variable was coded according to these three 
types. The coders were subsequently asked to describe the form 
of the videos more precisely.
Within these categories, I have observed the following 
variations of genres: (1) professional (61 videos): a live TV 
report with a standing reporter, a live video report, a news 
program with a moderator(s) and news pieces from reporters, 
an interview in a professional setting, a professional radio 
broadcast; (2) semi-professional (49 videos): a witness 
report, a moderator(s) in an improvised studio commenting 
on videos, satirical videos (film clips dubbed in a satirical 
way; memes); (3) amateur (59 videos): a blogger in front of 
a computer commenting on videos from their desktop, a 
blogger of anonymous identity commenting on the news 
(this can be a blogger in a mask, and/or with an altered voice 
or the voice of a bot), a picture with a voiceover.
All the three types of genres were used by all the three 
types of publics. At the same time, we observed some 
remarkable patterns in using the genres by pro-state (uncriti-
cal) and oppositional (leadership-critical) publics. Thus, both 
channels by Navalny (leadership-critical publics) produced 
professional videos, although Navalny’s personal addresses 
to his followers were made with the aesthetics of semi-pro-
fessional vlogger videos, with him sitting against a simple 
background with a laptop and showing some video clips. 
However, the majority of pro-state videos were made in 
semi-professional and amateur styles. These were, for 
instance, satirical videos that mocked the opposition. Some 
videos were titled in an oppositional way and looked opposi-
tional, but, in fact, aimed to defame the opposition leaders. 
As for policy-critical videos, the majority of them were rep-
resented in professional video formats.
Thus, we have observed that pro-state actors sought to co-
opt the platform by adopting a semi-professional and ama-
teur style, and oppositional channels tried to professionalize 
the production of their videos so that they could keep up with 
the state TV programs and thus become a competitive alter-
native to uncritical TV publics.
This study does not aim at analyzing agenda-setting mech-
anisms, but my observation of discursive practices shows that 
there were certain patterns in agenda spill-overs between 
oppositional and pro-state videos: oppositional videos reacted 
to the content and topics set by the state media, whereas pro-
state accounts avoided referring to the agenda set by the oppo-
sition (for instance, Navalny’s “voters” strike). It is also 
remarkable that a large number of the popular pro-state videos 
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were dedicated to topics of foreign policy, whereas the oppo-
sitional videos tackled mostly inner political problems.
Based on this analysis, I conclude that the public that was 
created in the “Popular” section of Russian YouTube in the 
wake of the presidential election of 2018 can be defined as 
leadership-critical. It can also be described as crossroads of 
opinions, where different political views are tolerated and 
can gain popularity within one technological environment, 
thus constituting a unique space in the Russian media system 
for otherwise unwelcome politically diverse TV content. We 
have observed a predominance of leadership-critical dis-
course that was created by systematic activity on the part of 
professional and semi-professional oppositional actors. The 
pro-state actors tried to co-opt the platform, but, as of March 
2018, they did not have the same success in their attempt as 
the oppositional communication channels did.
Discussion
This study examined the role of YouTube in the Russian 
authoritarian elections and contributed mainly to two strands 
of research: (1) political communication on YouTube and (2) 
studies of consultative authoritarianism.
The results show a significant difference in the roles elite 
and non-elite actors play in political communication on 
YouTube during elections, compared to democratic contexts 
(see Dylko et al., 2011; May, 2010). It was non-systemic 
opposition as well as non-institutional actors and YouTube-
only media that dominated the discourse of the most popular 
videos during the presidential election in Russia. Pro-state 
actors strove to co-opt the platform, but did not experience 
the same success as alternative sources, in contrast to studies 
of democratic contexts that have shown that traditional 
media and mainstream political actors receive the highest 
amount of attention during election campaigns.
We have observed that YouTube as a platform has gained 
significance as an alternative communication space in Russia 
compared to the protest wave of 2011–2012 (Bodrunova & 
Litvinenko, 2013; Denisova, 2017). This proves the assump-
tion of some scholars that the same global platform can play 
different roles depending on socio-political context and time 
period (Nikiporets-Takigawa, 2014; Oates, 2013). As Oates 
(2013) has noted, “[. . .] any online communication tool can-
not be understood to have a single role within a society or 
even a particular protest. Rather, online communication tools 
both reflect and refract existing power and informational net-
works within a country” (p. 182).
As for political communication in consultative authori-
tarianism, we have observed how a leadership-critical public 
was constructed within a state-dominated public-at-large. It 
was not only oppositional political speakers with their con-
sistent publication strategies that contributed to the success 
of the oppositional discourse, but also the audience as pas-
sive and active participants of this public: the users proac-
tively searched for and reacted to the alternative information, 
which boosted the popularity of oppositional videos, despite 
the alleged manipulations of pro-state actors that reportedly 
tried to downgrade critical videos.
The pro-state accounts were not successful in promoting 
their discourse in the political videos of YouTube. This may be 
explained partly by the fact that their content did not meet the 
demands of the audience that sought alternative information 
on the platform. Moreover, there is an obvious contradiction 
between the nature of the open content sharing platform and 
the ambition of an authoritarian state to control communica-
tion flows. This approach ignores “the fundamental cultural 
logic of YouTube,” which, according to Burgess and Green, 
draws on authenticity (Burgess & Green, 2018).
Despite of the predominance of the leadership-critical dis-
course on YouTube in the wake of the presidential election, the 
state did not employ any restrictions on the platform, although 
it had legislative tools to do so and even warned of blocking 
the platform after YouTube refused to delete one of Navalny’s 
videos in February 2018 (Meduza, 2018). This fact shows that 
perceived benefits for the regime from tolerating this public 
apparently prevailed over the risks of losing control over the 
information flows and endangering the stability of the regime. 
Alongside the possible benefits listed by Toepfl (feedback for 
the elite about the real state of public opinion, co-optation of 
opposition elites, venting anger), one other benefit for the 
regime can be added that, in my view, played a role in this 
particular case. Navalny’s strategy of making his followers, 
who were protest voters, boycott the elections (“voters” strike) 
played into the hands of the state. It practically matched the 
strategy of the Kremlin that aimed at raising turnout of certain 
voters by mobilizing Putin’s core electorate, while the mobili-
zation of protest voters was undesired (Rogov, 2018). The 
results of the elections exceeded even the most optimistic 
expectations of pro-state sociologists (Baunov et al., 2018): 
Putin gained 77% of the vote with a turnout of 67.5% (Central 
Election Committee [CEC] of the Russian Federation, 2018). 
This obviously proves that the strategy of tolerating a leader-
ship-critical public on YouTube in the wake of authoritarian 
elections was, at the end of the day, beneficial for the state.
Conclusion
This study was based on an analysis of the most popular vid-
eos on Russian YouTube during the presidential election of 
2018. Analysis of other authoritarian contexts, as well as 
studies of non-electoral periods, would help to better under-
stand the role of YouTube in political communication in vari-
ous socio-political contexts. Other paths for future research 
may include a study of the second level of participation on 
YouTube in authoritarian contexts (Boyd, 2014), in particu-
lar, comment sections and the role that pro-state trolls play in 
creating publics under YouTube videos, as well as studies of 
audience perception of political YouTube videos. To better 
understand the functioning of consultative authoritarianism, 
other Web 2.0 platforms, such as Facebook or Telegram, 
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could be placed under scrutiny, as well as mechanisms of 
agenda-setting and spill-overs of agendas between different 
types of partial publics, both within national contexts and in 
a cross-cultural comparative perspective.
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